NSPU

Four words sum up the work of International Crisis Group when one visits it’s website: Conflict Prevention and Resolution. Judging by the high level endorsement International Crisis Group’s work has been receiving, one is bound to pose the question: has the ICG been true to its words - conflict prevention and conflict resolution - as far as Somalia is concerned?

Since 2002 the ICG had produced 8 reports on different aspects of Somalia. Its 2003 report Somaliland: Democratisation and Discontents, is the most controversial as it generated debate not only on ICG report writers’ recommendations, but also their reading of Somalia’s pre and post independence history. Professors Ahmed Ismail Samatar and Abdi Ismail Samatar wrote a cogent essay that took the report authors to task on the grounds of partisanship and subjectivity in ICG report.

Due to the complex nature of Somali politics exemplified by the state collapse and civil war and leadership deficit, the uncertainty that continue to bedevil Somalis spotlights two factors:

1. Reluctance on the part of politicians and warlords to accept history’s verdict on Somalia’ experiment with the nation state: that the state cannot derive legitimacy from an ethnic power base
2. Absence of conflict resolution approach to political problems and challenges thrown up by Somalia’s post-independence nation-state.

Alternative History

The report Somaliland: Democratisation and its Discontents were produced after the 2003 Presidentialelections in “ Somaliland”. It contains factual errors that does not only reveal methodological lapses but also run counter to ICG’s characterisation as “an independent, non-profit, non-governmental organization, with over 110 staff members on five continents, working through field-based analysis and high-level advocacy to prevent and resolve deadly conflicts.”

The report writers’ reading of Somalia’s 20th century history calls for historiographical examination. How report writers interpreted past political and social upheavals in Somaliland is flawed.

About the Dervish Movement led by Sayid Mohamed Abdulle Hassan, the report states, “the Sheikh’s uprising tended to divide rather than unite them,” and adds “it was a schism that would prefigure Somaliland politics for much of the century.”
The Sayyid was “controversial” religious leader whose poetry ‘clannish’ response alienated many people who would have joined the Dervish movement. People in the ex- British Somaliland moved on after the defeat of the Dervishes. No Somali sided with the British. The ICG report states that the Isaaq clan “tended to side with the British”. If that were the case no liberation movement would have emerged from Ex-British Somaliland after the defeat of Dervish movement.  Somaliland politicians who moved to Mogadishu to be part of the new government jostled for power and influence in their constituencies. No shadow of the Dervish movement was lingering over their heads. Which Somaliland did the report refer to then?

ICG report writers show carelessness in fact checking when discussing the divided nature of some of the Sool & Sanaag Darod clan.

“The honeymoon with Puntland did not last long, and a new focus for Dhulbahante loyalty emerged with the formation of a Somali Transitional National Government (TNG) at Arta, Djibouti.”

Both Puntland and Somaliland administrations opposed the TNG administration. No member of the TNG visited Las Canod during the tenure of TNG president Abdulqasim Salat Hassan. ICG report writers resort to base culturalist interpretation of the complex political and social problems in Somalia. If  ICG’s line of reasoning is correct, it is not absurd to think of Somaliland enterprise as an Isaaq political dream: if Dhulbahante can move in one direction each time, why cannot Isaaq do likewise? Or is the Isaaq clan a different species?  ICG report ignores the diverse and commendable diverse political views of the Dhulbabahabte. The Somaliland administration did not refute any of the reports’ conclusions and formulations because ICG has been making a case for Somaliland!

The International Crisis is either unable to be objective about the Somali problem
because of incompetent  researchers, or it has an insidious agenda in Somalia.

There is no bibliography in the report. It is a choice that gave the report writers the privilege to impart information from one perspective, their perspective. Scholarship depends on objectivity. It is neither ethnographic research nor a piece of social research.

Matt Bryden

Matt Bryden is International Crisis Group’s Horn of Africa Project Director. His earlier
“Work” on the Somali imbroglio is in sharp contrast with his current trajectory. There was an element of objectivity in his assessment of Somaliland’s achievements and seething contradictions within both Unionists and secessionist movements while he worked for the War-torn Societies project (WSP).

At the ICG his error of judgements continue to baffle Somalis and disinterested observers of the Somali scene alike. Given Matt Brdyen’s research appearance and his familiarity with the intricacies of Somali politics, it is difficult to look upon his omission as an oversight.

In an answer to a question about AU’s adherence to colonial borders posed by VOA’s Voice of America’s Abdeyo, Mark Byden replied thus:

“Somaliland would answer ‘yes’ because the borders it received at the moment of independence was those of Somaliland not of Greater Somalia and so its claim to recognition is consistent with the AU charter and indeed having once been an independent state, Somaliland’s claim to independence is probably stronger than that of territories such as Eritrea and Western Sahara, that are already members of the AU.”

Matt Bryden response raises major questions about professional distance that he is expected to maintain in his capacity as Horn of Africa Project Director at ICG.  In his paper: Envisioning a Dialogue on the question of Somali Unity published in African SecurityReview in 2004, Matt Bryden reflections pinpoint barriers that stand in the way of a constructive dialogue between unionists and secessionists.  He wrote the paper shortly before the Transitional Federal Government of Somalia emerged from IGAD sponsored Somali peace conference. The report contains contradictions and selective reading about the Somali crisis.

“Aspirations of Somaliland is anathema to a significant minority of Somalilanders, and to the vast majority of Southern Somalis as well” Matt Bryden wrote. No recognised referendum has taken place through any part of Somalia since 1991.
 One wonders on what basis did ICG’s Horn of Africa coordinator, concluded that secessionists far outnumber unionists in Ex-British Somaliland.
Matt Bryden demolished his thesis in the following words:

“The Somaliland leadership, remembering what happened in the 1961 referendum, will insist that only the people of Somaliland have the right to cast ballots. Even so, a Somaliland-only ballot will not entirely resolve the problem: southerners will demand that the results be tallied on a region-by-region basis. This would permit the eastern Sanaag and Sool regions to opt out of the secession if a majority of the Dhulbahante and Warsengeli populations so cast their ballots. However, since the loss of Sool and eastern Sanaag would mean forfeiting the boundaries received by Somaliland at the moment of independence, it would almost certainly disqualify it for admission into the AU, which would jeopardise the likelihood of it being granted international recognition.” (Italics ours).

From these premises Matt Bryden invites us to conclude that Southern Somalis are influencing decisions of unionists in ex-British Somaliland. If the southern Somalis are denied to exercise the right to have a say on the future of Somali political system, secessionists will not have to exercise the right to self-determination, despite the wrong use of the word in Somali context.

Which brings us to the question of colonial borders that some analysts use to make a case for Somaliland. Since Somalis did not choose to have their country dismembered for colonial purposes, invoking the principle of inviolability of colonial borders will be more of a historical fact than a legal basis. Secessionists can challenge the Somali Unity to which they have contributed a lot without deploying arguments that lose sight of the fact that Somalis were not divided before colonialists carved up the Somali lands. All reconciliation conferences and diplomatic efforts aim to help Somalis agree on some sort of political arrangements that pull their country out of the hell hole into which it fell. These efforts will not bear fruits if Somalia’s past and present problems are not thought through. Organizations such as International Crisis Group can play a role in bridging the communication gap by avoiding making statements and conclusions that can smack of bias.  ICG’s work on Somali reveals that the organization’s very credibility is at stake.

Its reports on Somalia need to be read closely for the benefit of policy makers the ICG wants to influence.  Somalis deserve a right of reply.

Abdi A. Duale
E-Mail:abdi_duale2000@yahoo.com

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Notes:

In his 2004 African Security Review paper Somalia and Somaliland: Envisioning aDialogue of the Question of Somali Unity, Matt Bryden makes a suggestion that might bring unionists and secessionists together. “Some form of qualified recognition, such as awarding both parties observer status in various international organisations (such as the UN, AU and IGAD), would help to level the playing field and provide an incentive for both sides to come to the table.”Compare this with the ICG 2003 report  Somaliland: Democratisation and Discontents

 which contains the following recommendations: “Granting Somaliland some kind of increased international profile but without formal recognition—for example observer status at the UN, AU and IGAD could help to prepare the ground for eventual negotiations between the two equals, Somalia and Somalia.”