NSPU

I am responding to an article by Dustin Dehéz entitled '' Somaliland and the Issue of International Recognition''(dated 23 January 2006) which appeared in the magazine PINR and also reprinted at WardheerNews.com. The writer has rightly applauded Somaliland for its relative peace and successful elections and referendum in the country (not all by any means) which makes such a contrast to most of lawless Somalia. However, Mr. Dehéz obvious empathy for the secessionists/separatists amounts to advocating recognition for a rebel entity.

Judging by Mr. Dehèz's presentation, the ordinary reader unfamiliar with Somalia would be forgiven to conclude that Somaliland is a distinctive separate country that has freed itself from alien rule just as Kosovo broke away from Serbia’s tutelage. Mr. Dehéz may not concur with this interpretation but that is how most Somalis/readers will see it. As one from the area but whose regions do not subscribe to this treacherous secession, let me, for the benefit of your readers, set out the true historical perspective to the issue of Somaliland and Somalia.

The Somali people in the Horn of Africa were, and still are, the most homogenous people in Africa below the Sahara. They have the same religion, race, culture, language, blood ties and common homeland. Following the European scramble for Africa, the Somali homeland in the Horn of Africa was divided into five parts, creating British Somaliland, Italian Somaliland, French Somaliland (now Djibouti), Ethiopian Somaliland (Ogaden), and the North Eastern region of Kenya (NFD).

The consequence of these colonial conquests was that artificial boundaries were imposed on the Somalis in which clans found themselves divided among the various colonial territories. In the case of British Somaliland, the Darood clans, who inhabit the regions of Sool, Sanaag and Cayn (approximating over 40 percent of the geographical area of the so-called Somaliland), were separated from their fellow clan cousins in Southern Somalia (Puntalnd). So were the Gadabuaursi and Issas whose regions border Djibouti and Ethiopia. Thus, there are no particular common denominators among the clans in former British Somaliland that distinguish them from clans in other neighbouring Somali territories other than the British rule. Rather, they had less blood ties amongst themselves and more with those across the artificial borders in Italian, French, and Ethiopian Somalilands.

It is the artificial division of the Somali homeland in the Horn that served as the driving force for Somali nationalism and the struggle for Somali independence and unity. The five-pointed star of Somalia's national flag symbolizes the aspiration of Somalia's divided people to be free from foreign occupation or domination and that they will eventually unite as one country. The independence of former British and Italian Somalilands and their unity on July first, 1960 was the first realization of this dream. To suggest as Mr. Dehéz does that there were problems soon after independence is an exaggeration. It is true that there were initially some teething administrative problems as was to be expected given that the territories were under colonial powers with different administrative systems for nearly a century. It is also true that the Isaaq clan were somewhat grumpy about losing their former dominance of the North during the time of the British rule. All other clans were indeed very happy to be part of Somalia. If there were problems, they had nothing to do with the Union per se but to historically inherited difficulties or to the wrongs of Somali leaders as later happened.

When the Somali rebel movements succeeded in 1991 to topple the government of the late dictator Siyad Barre, with military help from Ethiopia, the Isaaq clan in the North Western region of Somalia declared their secession from Somalia and adopted the old name colonial name of Somaliland. They had been successful to the extent of propagating the lie that all the other clans in the territory are fully behind this secession. That is a blatant travesty of the facts.. The Darood clans in the territory remain as loyal to their membership of Somalia as they had been since July 1960 when the former British and Italian Somalilands united. So are the overwhelming majority of Gadabuursi and Issa's. But unlike the Daroods in Sool and Sanaag who can fight off the secessionists and repulse any intrusion into their territory, the Gadabuursi have no such advantages. They had suffered atrocities in 1991 from the Isaaq rebel movement (Somali National Movement) and are understandably not keen for the time being to provoke any military reprisals from the Isaaqs, unless thy can count on the support of an effective and functioning Somali government in Mogadishu which can come to their aid.

The impression created by Mr. Dehèz that there is a “dispute” over Sool and Sanaag between Puntland and Somaliland is ludicrous. Puntland (including Sool and Sanaag) is part and parcel of Somalia just as the rest of Somaliland is. To suggest that there is a dispute between Somalia and Somaliland is to imply that Somaliland is itself not part of Somalia. It also implies that the people in the area under “dispute” do not exist or else that their voice/wishes do not count. Most likely this writer may be a victim of the secessionist’s disinformation that Puntland had grabbed regions belonging to Somaliland. This interpretation is possible since writers or journalists visiting Hargeisa rarely ever go to the regions in question; Sool and Sanaag and ascertain for themselves what the true facts are: that it is the people in Sool and Sanaag regions who took the initiative to join the Puntalnd administration rather than the other way round.

A rebel entity, based on one clan, has no legal basis to claim regions belonging to other clans, whose inhabitants had repeatedly made clear that they have nothing to do with the secession. Sool, Sanaag and Cayn regions had never participated in the elections and referendums organized by the secessionists which Mr. Dehéz wrongly describes as having been nationwide. How “wide” is the question?

Mr Dehéz makes contradictory observations regarding support for Somalia's unity. On the one hand, he points out thattheIntergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), comprising of the East African countries of Ethiopia, Eritrea, Djibouti, Somalia, Uganda, Kenya and Sudan, as being collectively “committed to Somalia’s unity”. On the other hand, he states in his conclusion that "neighbouring countries [supposedly IGAD] are deeply divided on the issue”. The fact of the matter is that IGAD, the African Union, the European Union, the UN, the Arab League, the Organization of Islamic Conference have all reaffirmed Somalia's unity.

Mr. Dehéz misrepresents the British position when he suggests that the former colonial powers, Britain and Italy, do not see eye to eye about the Somalia’s problem and its solution. Nothing Britain has said or done can be interpreted that way. On the contrary, Britain has always joined other UN security members and its EU members to support Somalia unity. So has Italy. Britain had never given any false hopes to the secessionists regarding possible recognition. On the contrary, it has repeatedly advised them to settle their problems with their fellow brothers in Somalia.

Finally, Mr. Dehéz says that a “resolution of Somaliland's status is a prerequisite for success of the peace process in overall Somalia”. There is no dispute or question about Somaliland’s status. It has no other status other than being a region of Somalia. That is the status that the international community recognizes as of now. If Mr. Dehéz is suggesting otherwise, meaning that the area be recognized as an independent country separate from Somalia, that is not the way to peace. It is a sure prescription for fanning the flames of the Somali civil war. Inevitably, there will be war between the Daroods and the Isaaqs over Sool and Sanaag. One can also envisage intervention by the Somali government – assuming it overcomes its present difficulties That augurs ill for the stability of the Horn and Africa as a whole. It is in the interest of peace that the clan-based secession be discouraged.

In today’s Federal democratic Somalia, regions have more or less self autonomy. The Isaaq-dominated secessionists in the North have everything to gain by playing their full part in Somalia. To refuse unity is to unite the rest of the Somali people against them. Sooner or later, there is bound to be action from a future more effective and powerful government in Somalia. This time, the secessionists will not be facing Siyad Barre and its dreaded regime but the rest of the Somali people. It is a pity that Mr. Dehéz who appears to have empathy for the secessionists did not venture to give them such simple home truths.

By Ali Geeleh
Email:Aligeeleh@yahoo.co.uk